德勤－复旦会计论坛系列269期讲座-申请方
主办方
复旦大学管理学院
讲座介绍
limited disclosure in private investments in public equity (pipes) constrains public investors’ ability to assess the informational content of announced pipe transactions beyond what is reflected in the final issue price. leveraging china’s pipe market, where regulators mandate disclosure of the full distribution of submitted bids, we examine whether revealing opinion divergence among pipe investors conveys incremental value-relevant information. we measure opinion divergence using bid price dispersion across all pipe investors, including those who do not receive allocations, and find that it is positively associated with absolute stock price reactions at pipe completion announcements. greater bid dispersion also predicts lower post-placement earnings and higher earnings volatility, suggesting that disagreement among informed investors reflects underlying firm performance and risk. using investor-level bid data, we further document a real effect: persistent extreme bidding becomes less likely once individual bids are publicly observable. overall, our findings highlight the informational and incentive effects of granular investor-level disclosure and offer policy-relevant insights for ongoing disclosure reforms in pipe and spac markets.
演讲人
陈泽云
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